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Abstract
This paper presents a new data set of individual residential property transactions in England.
The main novelty of the data is the record of all listing price changes and all o®ers made
between initial listing and sale agreement. We establish a number of stylized facts pertaining
to the sequence of events that occur within individual property transaction histories. We assess
the limitations of existing theories in explaining the data and discuss alternative theoretical
frameworks for the study of the strategic interactions between buyers and sellers.
1 Introduction
The sale of a house is a typical example of a situation that entails strategic interactions
between a seller and a set of potential buyers. When a house is put on the market, the
seller posts a listing price and waits for potential buyers to make o®ers. When a match
between the seller and a potential buyer occurs, bargaining takes place, leading possibly
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Revised 11 May 2004to a sale agreement. At any point in time while a house is still on the market, the seller
has the option of revising the listing price.
This paper presents and investigates a new data set of individual residential property
transactions in England. The main novel features of our data are the record of all listing
price changes and all o®ers ever made on a property since initial listing. In addition,
we have a complete record of visits by potential buyers, called viewings, for a subset
of the transactions in our sample. We are therefore in a unique position to analyze the
behavior of buyers and sellers within individual transaction histories and the extent to
which the sequence of events leading to a transaction a®ect the sale price. 1
The picture of the house transaction process that emerges from the data can be sum-
marized as follows. The listing price in°uences the arrival of o®ers, which ultimately
determines the timing of the sale. As time on the market increases, the arrival rate of
potential buyers decreases and the probability of a listing price revision increases. The
longer the time the property remains on the market, the lower the level of o®ers relative
to the listing price, the higher the probability a match is successful, and the lower the
sale price relative to the listing price.
A relatively high initial listing price results in a higher sale price but also a longer
time on the market. Listing price reductions concern primarily properties that have not
received any o®er while being on the market for a substantial period of time (in fact,
a period equal to the average time to sale). Proportionally, decreases in listing price
are also substantial (in fact, greater than the average percentage di®erence between the
sale price and the initial listing price).
Almost 40 percent of sales occur at the ¯rst o®er ever received. One third of the potential
buyers whose ¯rst o®er is turned down walk away from the negotiation. The remaining
two thirds continue bargaining with the seller and are observed to make up to four
consecutive, increasing o®ers before either they succeed in purchasing the property or
the negotiation terminates without an agreement.
One third of all matches between a seller and a potential buyer are unsuccessful. The
vast majority of sellers whose ¯rst match is unsuccessful end up selling at a higher price;
a few end up accepting a lower o®er. The higher the number of matches in a transaction
1 Since our data set was constructed from sales records, it does not include unsold properties
that are withdrawn from the market. We describe the main features of our data in detail in
Section 2.
2history, the higher the sale price. These are just a few of the salient features observed
in the data.
To date, the lack of adequate data has limited the scope of empirical research on housing
transactions. 2 Existing data sets typically include property characteristics, time to sale,
initial listing price, and sale price. They do not contain information on the buyer's side
of the transaction (e.g., the timing and terms of o®ers made by potential buyers), or
on the seller's behavior between the listing and the sale of a property (e.g., the seller's
decision to reject an o®er or to revise the listing price). This explains why most of the
empirical literature on housing transactions has either focused on the determinants of
the sale price or on the role of the listing price and its e®ect on the time to sale. 3
Recent attempts to overcome some of the data limitations by supplementing con-
ventional data sets with additional information have generated valuable insights. For
example, Genesove and Mayer [13] build a data set for the Boston condominium mar-
ket where they are able to uncover the ¯nancial position of each seller. They ¯nd that
sellers with high loan-to-value ratio tend to set a higher initial listing price, have a
lower probability of sale but, if and when they sell, obtain a higher price. Glower et
al. [15] conduct a phone survey to obtain information on each seller's motivation (e.g.,
whether or not they have a planned moving date), for a real estate transaction data set
for Columbus, Ohio. The evidence suggests that sellers convey information about their
willingness to sell (i.e., their reservation value), through the listing price. 4
In addition to providing a valuable resource for empirical research on housing transac-
tions, our data raises new challenges for theoretical research on the strategic interactions
between buyers and sellers. 5 We assess the limitations of existing theories in explain-
ing the data and discuss alternative frameworks that are consistent with the empirical
evidence. Our analysis highlights the importance of accounting for incomplete informa-
tion in the matching and bargaining environment where buyers and sellers interact in
2 This is also true for other markets where the transaction process involves search, matching
and bargaining, since the lack of data on rejected o®ers is pervasive.
3 See, e.g., Horowitz [18], Miller and Sklarz [24], and Zuehlke [35].
4 Similar evidence is reported, for example, in Anglin et al. [2], Genesove and Mayer [14],
Knight et al. [20], and Knight [31].
5 For existing theoretical models of the behavior of buyers and sellers in the housing market
see, e.g., Arnold [3], Chen and Rosenthal [6] and [7], Coles [10], Horowitz [18], Krainer [22],
Taylor [32], Yava» s [33], and Yava» s and Yang [34].
3order to explain the sequence of events in the housing transaction process as well as its
outcomes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data set and
provides institutional details of the residential real estate market in England. Section 3
reports the results of our descriptive empirical analysis of the process leading to the sale
of a property, from its initial listing to a sale agreement. In Section 4, we summarize
our main ¯ndings, discuss the limitations of existing theories, and suggest alternative
theoretical frameworks that are consistent with the data. We conclude with Section 5.
2 Data
In England, most residential properties are marketed under sole agency agreement.
This means that a property is listed with a single real estate agency that coordinates
all market related activities concerning that property from the time it is listed until it
either sells or is withdrawn.
Agencies represent the seller only. Listing a property with an agency entails publishing
a sheet of property characteristics and a listing price. 6 The listing price may be revised
at any time at the discretion of the seller. Potential buyers search by visiting local real
estate agents and viewing properties. A match between the seller and a potential buyer
occurs when the potential buyer makes an o®er. Within a match, the general practice
is for the seller to either accept or reject o®ers. In the event the seller rejects an o®er,
the potential buyer either makes another o®er or walks away. If agreement occurs, both
parties engage the administrative procedure leading to the exchange of contracts and
the completion of the transaction. This procedure typically lasts three to eight weeks.
During this period, among other things, the buyer applies for mortgage and has the
property surveyed. Each party may cancel the sale agreement up to the exchange of
contracts. 7
For each property it represents, the agency keeps a ¯le containing a detailed description
of the property, its listing price, and a record of listing price changes, o®ers, and terms
6 Although not legally binding, the listing price is generally understood as a price the seller
is committed to accept.
7 Cancelling a sale agreement does not cost anything per se. However, the later a cancellation
occurs after sale agreement, the more each party will have spent on lawyer and administrative
fees. These payments cannot be recovered.
4of the sale agreement, as required by law. The information contained in each individual
¯le is also recorded on the accounting register that is used by each agency to report
to the head o±ce. Although all visits of a property by potential buyers are arranged
by the listing agency, recording viewings is not required either by the head o±ce or by
law. However, individual agencies may require their agents to collect this information
for internal management purposes.
Our data set was obtained from the sales records of four real estate agencies in Eng-
land. 8 Three of these agencies operate in the Greater London metropolitan area, one in
South Yorkshire. Our sample consists of 780 complete transaction histories of properties
listed and sold between June 1995 and April 1998 under sole agency agreement. 9 Each
observation contains the property's characteristics as shown on the information sheet
published by the agency at the time of initial listing, the listing price and the date of the
listing. If any listing price change occurs, we observe its date and the new price. Each
match is described by the date of the ¯rst o®er by a potential buyer and the sequence
of buyer's o®ers within the match. When a match is successful, we observe the sale
agreed price and the date of agreement which terminate the history. In addition, for the
properties listed with one of our Greater London agencies (which account for about a
fourth of the observations in our sample), we observe the complete history of viewings.
Since events are typically recorded by agents within the week of their occurrence, we
use the week as our unit of measure of time.
Our data spans two geographic areas with di®erent local economic conditions and two
di®erent phases of the cycle in the housing market. While the local economy in Greater
London has been experiencing a prolonged period of sustained growth, this has not been
the case in South Yorkshire. Furthermore, from June 1995 to April 1998, the housing
market in the Greater London metropolitan area went from a slow recovery to a boom.
While this transition occurred gradually, for ease of exposition we refer to 1995-96 as
the recovery and to 1997-98 as the boom.
Table 1 contains an overview of some of the features of our data. Column 1 refers
to the properties in our sample located in South Yorkshire. Columns 2 and 3 refer to
8 These agencies are all part of Halifax Estate Agencies Limited, one of the largest network
of real estate agents in England.
9 Each entry in our data was validated by checking the consistency of the records in the




Yorkshire London London Overall
95-98 95-96 97-98 95-98
Number of observations 343 239 198 780
Average initial listing price($) 40,665 86,783 99,820 69,812
% transactions with a price change 35.28 17.99 8.59 23.21
Average number of matches 1.26 1.62 1.53 1.44
Average number of o®ers 1.73 2.91 2.38 2.26
Average sale price($) 37,989 83,524 97,168 66,964
Sale price/listing price (%) 93.4 96.2 97.3 95.9
Average weeks to sale 15 10 7 11
properties located in Greater London that were listed during the recovery and the boom,
respectively. Column 4 refers to the overall sample. Several observations are noteworthy.
First, more active housing markets (e.g., Greater London vs. South Yorkshire) appear to
be characterized by higher sale price relative to listing price, fewer listing price changes,
more o®ers, and more matches. Most of these observations hold true when we compare
booming markets to dull markets (e.g., Greater London in 1997-98 vs. 1995-96). On
average, properties in our sample sell at about 96% of their listing price after being
on the market for 11 weeks. More than three quarters of all properties sell without
any revision of their listing price. The average number of matches and the average
number of o®ers indicate that most properties are sold to the ¯rst potential buyer who
makes an o®er on the property, but not necessarily at their ¯rst o®er. In addition to
the information reported in Table 1, note that for the sub-sample of 200 properties for
which viewings records are available, the average number of viewings per property is
equal to 9.5 and the average number of viewings per week on the market is equal to
1.7.
Table 2 contains descriptive statistics of the main characteristics of the properties in our
sample. 10 The variables FLAT, TERR, SEMI, and DET are dummy variables for the
10 These characteristics are only a subset of the ones listed in the information sheet published
by the agency at the time of initial listing. The additional variables were excluded from our
analysis since they appear to have no signi¯cant e®ects on prices.
6Table 2
Property Characteristics
Yorkshire London London Overall
97{98 95{96 97{98 95{98
Variable Avg St Dev Avg St Dev Avg St Dev Avg St Dev
FLAT 0.026 0.16 0.264 0.442 0.439 0.498 0.204 0.403
TERR 0.318 0.466 0.222 0.416 0.263 0.441 0.274 0.446
SEMI 0.464 0.499 0.389 0.489 0.202 0.403 0.375 0.484
DET 0.192 0.395 0.125 0.332 0.096 0.295 0.147 0.355
TOTA 66.1 17.5 59.0 22.1 53.93 18.07 60.8 19.8
NBATH 1.24 0.576 1.42 0.615 1.29 0.519 1.31 0.579
GARAGE 0.426 0.495 0.377 0.486 0.263 0.441 0.369 0.483
APPL 0.793 1.190 1.250 1.500 0.949 1.170 0.973 1.306
B1 0.006 0.076 0.184 0.388 0.263 0.441 0.126 0.332
B2 0.306 0.462 0.31 0.463 0.323 0.469 0.312 0.463
B3 0.592 0.492 0.364 0.482 0.353 0.479 0.461 0.499
B4 0.096 0.295 0.142 0.35 0.061 0.239 0.101 0.302
type of property. They denote °ats, terraced, semi-detached, and detached properties,
respectively. The variables B1, B2, B3, and B4 are dummy variables which stand for one,
two, three, and four or more bedrooms, respectively. GARAGE indicates whether the
property has a garage. TOTA is the total area measured in square meters, NBATH is the
number of bathrooms, and APPL is the number of appliances listed on the characteristic
sheet published by the agent. 11 As we can see from column 7, most properties in our
sample have either two or three bedrooms (77 percent). Semi-detached properties are
the most represented (38 percent). Terraced properties, detached houses, and °ats,
account for 27, 15, and 20 percent of the sample, respectively. The remainder of the
table illustrates the type of housing sold in each of the local markets we consider.
Before turning our attention to the analysis of the data, a few remarks are in order.
First, our data refers to complete transaction histories only, from initial listing to sale
11 Agents typically list the major appliances to be left with the property. The number of such
appliances was the only information recorded in the data set.
7agreement. In particular, properties that are listed and then withdrawn from the market
before a sale agreement are not in our sample. For this reason, the emphasis of the paper
is on the events leading to the sale of a property and on the behavior of buyers and
sellers during this process. 12
Second, while none of the properties in the data set were sold at a formal auction, it
is nevertheless possible that two or more buyers found themselves bidding on the same
property at the same time. Sifting through the records of transaction histories, we detect
the occurrence of about 30 de facto auctions out of 780 transactions. The properties
concerned sold at a higher than average price relative to e®ective listing price. In fact,
such de facto auctions account for all instances in the data where the sale price is above
the listing price (except for small di®erences due to rounding up). All the qualitative
and quantitative ¯ndings of our analysis are robust to the exclusion of these transaction
histories from the data set.
Third, the cancellation of a sale agreement is not a rare phenomenon. In our sample, 1
out of 5 agreements is cancelled. Agents' records indicate that cancellations are usually
due to the arrival of new information such as a bad inspection outcome or failure to ob-
tain mortgage. A sale agreement may also be contingent upon the successful completion
of other transactions (e.g., the purchase of a house by the seller). Hence, cancellations
may also be induced by the failure of related transactions. Here we implicitly assume
that parties bargain in earnest. That is, we assume that the right to cancel a sale agree-
ment does not distort the behavior of the parties involved in a housing transaction and
that the object of a negotiation is the sale of a house.
3 Descriptive Empirical Analysis
In this section, we analyze the details of the process leading to the sale of a property,
from its initial listing to a sale agreement. The ¯rst step in this process is the setting
of the listing price on the part of the seller. In section 3.1, we analyze the choice of the
initial listing price and whether, when, and to what extent sellers revise their decision.
The next step is the occurrence of matches between the seller and the potential buyers
who choose to make o®ers on a property. We describe the occurrence of matches in
section 3.2 and the sequence of o®ers within and across matches in section 3.3. The
¯nal step of the transaction process is the sale of a property. In section 3.4, we analyze
12 Withdrawals are not infrequent. Based on a preliminary investigation we estimate that as
many as 25 percent of all listings may end up being withdrawn prior to a sale.
8the timing and terms of the sale agreement. Restricting attention to the sub-sample of
properties for which information on viewings is available, we analyze the role played by
viewings in the process leading to the sale of a property in section 3.5.
To investigate the e®ects of local market conditions on transaction histories, throughout
our analysis we use agency-speci¯c dummy variables, labelled AGENCY1, AGENCY2,
AGENCY3, and AGENCY4, where AGENCYi is equal to 1 if the property is located
in the local market where agency i operates and 0 otherwise (i = 1;2;3;4). Note that
agencies 1, 2, and 3 list properties located in di®erent communities within the Greater
London metropolitan area, while agency 4 operates in South Yorkshire. Hence, the
agency dummies e®ectively capture the e®ect of a London location, while at the same
time measuring di®erences across the London agencies.
To account for aggregate dynamics in the English housing market, we specify a linear
trend for the month in our sampling period when each property was listed, MONTH, and
an additional linear trend for the properties located in Greater London, MONTHGL.
In our analysis, we also considered alternative, more °exible speci¯cations that would
capture aggregate changes over time in the housing market, such as polynomial trends,
or dummy variables for each quarter or each year. Such (more elaborate) speci¯cations,
however, yield only a marginal improvement in ¯tting the data over the simpler linear
trend speci¯cation considered here, and are therefore omitted.
Before presenting our results, it is important to stress that the purpose of our empirical
analysis is primarily descriptive. That is, the main goals of our study are to establish
new stylized facts (based on the novel aspects of our data), and to uncover interesting
correlations in the data, without attempting to assess whether these correlations can be
interpreted as causal relationships. Hence, several correlations we reveal in our analysis
are between endogenous variables (e.g., variables that describe the behavior of the seller
and the potential buyers in a transaction history), and should be interpreted accordingly.
3.1 Listing Price
We begin our analysis by investigating the relationship between the initial listing price
of a property and its observable characteristics. The results of a regression of the initial
listing price, ILISTP, on the property characteristics, agency dummies, and the trend
9Table 3
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variables MONTH and MONTHGL are reported in Table 3. 13 Note that the default
property is a one bedroom semi-detached house located in South Yorkshire (i.e., the
local market where agency 4 operates).
All of the parameter estimates associated with the property characteristics included in
the regression are statistically signi¯cant at conventional levels and have the expected
sign and reasonable magnitudes. 14 The variables included in our regression jointly
13 In this table, as for all other estimations below, we indicate whether each parameter estimate
is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero either at the 5 percent or at the 10 percent level. We indicate
each of these occurrences with the superscripts ¤¤ and ¤, respectively.
14 Given the size of its estimated coe±cient, the variable APPL must be capturing more than
the monetary value of what it accounts for.
10account for 80 percent of the observed variability in the initial listing price. Hence,
initial listing prices depend to a large extent on the observable characteristics of the
properties.
The estimates reported in Table 3 also allow us to usefully decompose the initial list-
ing price of each property in our sample into two components. Using the regression
results, let ILISTPHAT be the predicted listing price of a property based on its ob-
servable characteristics, and ILISTPRES the residual (clearly, ILISTP = ILISTPHAT
+ ILISTPRES). Hence, ILISTPHAT can be interpreted as the \normal" listing price
of a property (given its location, characteristics, and time of listing), and ILISTPRES
captures the extent to which a property is either over-priced or under-priced relative
to other, similar properties. In what follows, we use these variables to investigate the
relationship between the initial listing price of a property and the events that lead to
its sale. In particular, this decomposition of the initial listing price allows us to as-
sess whether there are any noticeable di®erences between the transaction histories of
expensive (or inexpensive) properties and over-priced (or under-priced) properties.
The ¯rst novelty of our data set is the information on listing price changes. This infor-
mation is summarized in Table 4. About one fourth of all sellers change their listing
price at least once. 15 Before a ¯rst price change, they wait 11 weeks on average. Recall
from Table 1 above that the average time to sale is also 11 weeks. This observation
suggests that sellers who change their listing price wait a signi¯cant amount of time
before doing it. In more active markets price changes are less frequent.
In the vast majority of cases, sellers who decrease their listing price have no prior re-
sponse from prospective buyers: in 86 percent of the cases, price changes occur before
an o®er was ever received. To explore whether this ¯nding is indicative of a robust
relationship between the lack of o®ers and the probability of a listing price reduction,
we estimate a Cox proportional hazard model for the probability of a ¯rst listing price
revision in any given week since initial listing. 16 The set of time-invariant variables
we consider includes the two components of the initial listing price, ILISTPHAT and
15 Only 9 transactions involved 3 listing price changes, the maximum observed in our sample.
16 The Cox proportional hazard model is a standard tool for the analysis of duration data
(see, e.g., Greene [16] and Miller [25]). The main advantage of this non-parametric approach is
that it provides a method of estimating the e®ects of covariates on duration without requiring
estimation of the baseline hazard function.
11Table 4
Listing Price Changes
Yorkshire London London Overall
95{98 95{96 97{98 95{98
Price change distribution:
% properties with 0 65 82 91 77
% properties with 1 26 14 8 18
% properties with 2+ 9 4 1 5
First price change:
Average % price decrease 6.3 3.4 2.6 5.3
Average weeks since listing 12 10 9 11
% properties with no o®er yet 92 71 80 86
Second price change:
Average % price decrease 4.8 2.6 | 4.4
Average weeks since ¯rst price change 9 7 | 8
% properties with no o®er yet 72 67 | 70
ILISTPRES, agency dummies, MONTH and MONTHGL. Our speci¯cation also in-
cludes a time-varying variable denoting, for each week since initial listing, the total
number of potential buyers who have made at least one o®er on the property up to that
week, NMATCH. 17
The estimation results are reported in Table 5. Note that, following convention, the
table contains the estimated hazard ratios associated with each variable (as opposed
to the estimated coe±cients), where a hazard ratio greater than one indicates that the
variable increases the probability of a price revision, and a hazard ratio smaller than
one indicates that the variable decreases the probability of a price revision.
Several interesting observations emerge from Table 5. Sellers who receive o®ers on their
property are less likely to revise their listing price than sellers who do not. In particular,
the probability of a listing price revision decreases with the number of potential buyers
17 Since not all sellers revise their listing price before selling their property, some observations
are censored. We correct for censoring in the estimation which is carried out by maximum
likelihood.
12Table 5
Probability of First Listing Price Change









who have made o®ers on a property. Price revisions are relatively less likely the more
expensive a property is (as measured by ILISTPHAT). The extent to which a property
is over or under priced (as measured by ILISTPRES), however, does not seem to have
any relationship with the probability of a price revision.
Virtually all price changes are price decreases. 18 As shown in Table 4, the drop in price
is typically substantial. 19 It is equal to 5.3 percent on average, which is greater than the
average sale price discount relative to initial listing price (4.1 percent). In more active
markets listing price reductions are smaller on average. To investigate which factors
are systematically related to the size of listing price reductions, we run a regression of
the ¯rst listing price revision (as a percentage of the initial listing price) on the two
components of the initial listing price, ILISTPHAT and ILISTPRES, agency dummies,
MONTH, MONTHGL, the number of weeks between initial listing and the price change,
WTFPC, and a dummy variable equal to one if no o®ers were made on the property
prior to the listing price revision, NOOFF. The results are reported in Table 6. 20 The
longer the time on the market before the change, the larger the drop. Also, the more
a property is over-priced (as measured by ILISTPRES), the smaller the listing price
18 Of the three cases of listing price increases, one is minor, less than one percent. The other
two are more substantial: one is an adjustment within a few days of initial listing, the other
occurs three months after initial listing.
19 Using data from Stockton, California, Knight [21] also ¯nds that when sellers change their
listing price, the listing price at the time of sale is substantially below the initial listing price.
20 The number of ¯rst listing price changes in our data is 181.
13Table 6
Size of First Listing Price Change












revision in percentage terms. The lack of o®ers, on the other hand, does not seem to
have any relationship with the magnitude of listing price changes.
3.2 Matches
The second novelty of our data set concerns the record of all matches that occur between
each seller in our sample and the potential buyers who choose to make o®ers on her
property. 21 This information is summarized in Table 7. Approximately 72 percent of
all transactions occur within the ¯rst match. Only 10 percent of all sales occur after 3
or more matches. 22 About a third of all matches are not successful. On average, the
success rate of ¯rst matches is higher than that of later matches. About three quarters
of the sellers are matched with a potential buyer within ten weeks of putting their
property on the market; more than ten percent within one week. Looking at di®erences
across local markets, columns 1-3 in Table 7 illustrate that more active markets and
21 Recall that, according to our de¯nition, a match occurs when a potential buyer makes an
o®er on a property.
22 Only 10 transactions occur after 5 or more matches and the maximum number of matches
in the sample is 7.
14Table 7
Matches
Yorkshire London London Overall
95{98 95{96 97{98 95{98
Matches per sale:
Average 1:2 1:6 1:5 1:4
% properties with 1 79:0 64:0 68:1 71:7
% properties with 2 17:2 20:9 17:7 18:4
% properties with 3 2:6 8 9:1 5:9
% properties with 4+ 1:2 7:1 5:1 3:9
Time to ¯rst match (weeks)
Average 12 7 5 9
Median 8 5 3 5
% with match within 1 week 3:5 16:3 16:7 12:6
% with match within 10 weeks 61:2 80:3 87:4 73:7
Success rate:
All matches 79:4 61:6 65:6 69:5
First match 81:6 66:5 72:2 74:6
Second match 70:8 58:1 54:0 61:1
Third match 69:2 47:2 50:0 51:9
booming markets are characterized by greater turnover: matches occur sooner, they are
more frequent, and their success rate is lower.
Figure 1 plots the average number of matches per week for all properties still on the
market. This measure of the rate of arrival of matches increases from the ¯rst to the
second week. Following this rise, the rate of arrival gradually decreases over time. 23
To explore whether there are systematic relationships between listing prices and the rate
of arrival of matches, we estimate a Cox proportional hazard model for the probability
23 Note that the slight increase in the rate of arrival of matches for very long durations is
a consequence of the fact that our data only contains properties that are sold and very few
properties are on the market for a very long time.
15Table 8
Probability of First Match









of the ¯rst match occurring in any given week since initial listing. The set of time-
invariant variables we consider includes the predicted (or \normal") component of the
initial listing price, ILISTPHAT, agency dummies, MONTH, and MONTHGL. Our
speci¯cation also includes two time-varying variables denoting the occurrence of listing
price changes, DPC, and the extent to which the current listing price in any given week
is di®erent from its normal level, CLISTPRES (which captures the extent to which a
property is relatively over-priced or under-priced over time). 24
The estimation results are contained in Table 8, where again we report the estimated
hazard ratios associated with each variable. 25 Holding everything else constant, the
probability of arrival of the ¯rst match increases with a listing price revision, but does
not vary with the listing price (regardless of whether a property is more or less expensive
per se, or whether it is over or under priced). Also, more active markets are associated
with a higher probability of arrival of the ¯rst match.
24 DPC is a time-varying indicator variable that takes the value 0 prior to a listing price change
and 1 from the occurrence of a listing price change on. In any given week, CLISTPRES is
equal to CLISTP, the current listing price, minus ILISTPHAT. Note that as long as a seller
does not revise the listing price, CLISTP is equal to ILISTP.
25 Recall that a hazard ratio greater than one indicates that the variable increases the prob-
ability of a match occurring, and a hazard ratio smaller than one indicates that the variable
decreases the probability of a match occurring.
16Table 9
O®ers
Yorkshire London London Overall
95{98 95{96 97{98 95{98
Number of matches 432 388 302 1122
Distribution of o®ers per match:
Average 1:4 1:8 1:6 1:6
% matches with 1 69:9 44:6 56:0 57:4
% matches with 2 23:4 34:5 33:1 29:9
% matches with 3 6:5 18:0 9:6 11:3
% matches with 4 0:2 2:8 1:3 1:4
First o®er relative to listing price 92:4 94:3 95:6 94:0
Increments within match:
First to second o®er 5:2 2:6 2:3 3:3
Second to third o®er 3:2 2:0 1:5 2:1
Percent negotiations terminated
After one unsuccessful o®er 36:6 28:3 31:1 31:5
After two unsuccessful o®ers 31:0 34:1 50:0 38:1
After three unsuccessful o®ers 50:0 65:6 71:4 66:7
3.3 O®ers
When a match occurs, the seller and the potential buyer engage in a bilateral bargaining
process characterized by a sequence of buyer's o®ers that the seller either accepts or
rejects. The third novelty of our data set is that it contains detailed information on all
o®ers ever made on a property. This information is summarized in Tables 9, 10, and 11.
Table 9 reports the main features of observed sequences of o®ers within matches. Po-
tential buyers make up to four consecutive o®ers. On average, successive o®ers within
a sequence increase at a decreasing rate. In more than half of the matches only one
o®er is exchanged. Almost 40 percent of sales occur at the ¯rst o®er ever received, 54
percent occur at the ¯rst o®er of a match. Upon rejection of their ¯rst o®er, 68 percent
of all potential buyers make a second o®er. The remaining 32 percent walk away, hence
terminating the negotiation. The incidence of separations increases with the number of
17Table 10
Spread of O®ers, Unsuccessful Matches
Yorkshire London London Overall
95{98 95{96 97{98 95{98
2 o®ers in match
First o®er relative to listing price 85.0 93.5 93.2 92.1
Last o®er relative to listing price 88.6 96.6 95.9 95.2
3 o®ers in match
First o®er relative to listing price | 90.9 92.3 91.1
Last o®er relative to listing price | 95.6 95.9 96.1
Table 11
First O®er Relative to Listing Price
Yorkshire London London Overall
95{98 95{96 97{98 95{98
First match 92:2 93:9 95:3 93:5
Second match 93:2 94:7 96:6 94:7
Third match 92:2 95:5 97:3 95:6
Fourth match 93:4 97:1 97:2 96:6
rejected o®ers. That is, the fraction of potential buyers who terminate a negotiation
after having their ¯rst o®er rejected is smaller than the fraction of potential buyers who
do so after a second or third rejection.
In Table 10, we restrict attention to the sequence of o®ers in unsuccessful matches (i.e.,
negotiations that terminate with a separation rather than a sale agreement). The higher
the number of o®ers in a match the lower the ¯rst o®er relative to the listing price. In
general, the higher the number of o®ers in a match, the higher the last o®er relative to
the current listing price. It therefore appears that the more o®ers there are in a match,
the broader the interval spanned by the o®ers. As we can see from columns 1-3 in Tables
9 and 10, in more active markets we observe a larger number of o®ers and o®ers that
are on average closer to the current listing price. Within o®er sequences, however, we
observe smaller increments.
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In Table 11, we compare the ¯rst o®er in a match across di®erent matches within a
transaction history. On average, the ¯rst o®er relative to the listing price is increasing
in the number of matches in a transaction history. In particular, both in the aggregate
as well as in each local market, the ¯rst o®er in the ¯rst match is on average farther
away from the listing price than the ¯rst o®er in successive matches.
To investigate which factors are systematically related to the level of the ¯rst o®er in a
match, we regress the ¯rst o®er in a match as a percentage of the current listing price
at the time of the match, PERFOCLP, on the predicted listing price, ILISTPHAT, the
extent to which the property is currently over-priced or under-priced, CLISTPRES, a
dummy variable denoting whether the seller revised the listing price prior to the match,
DPC, agency dummies, MONTH, MONTHGL, the number of weeks between initial
listing and the occurrence of the match, WTMATCH, and a dummy variable equal to
one if it is the ¯rst match and zero otherwise, MATCH1. The results are contained in
Table 12. 26
26 We report robust standard errors which account for the fact that observations are indepen-
dent across properties but not across matches within the same transaction history.
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Sale Price and Time to Sale
Yorkshire London London Overall
95{98 95{96 97{98 95{98
Sale price vs current listing price:
Average as percent of listing price 95.0 96.8 97.6 96.2
% with prices equal 13.4 8.4 26.8 15.3
% with sale price greater 5.0 2.5 4.6 4.1
Time to sale
Average 15 10 7 11
Median 10 7 5 7
Within 2 weeks 3.2 18.0 23.2 12.8
Within 20 weeks 75.8 89.1 93.9 84.5
Maximum 69 69 42 69
Ceteris paribus, the level of the ¯rst o®er in a match relative to the current listing price
is lower the longer a property has been on the market and if it is the ¯rst o®er ever
made on a property. Interestingly, the level of the ¯rst o®er in a match relative to the
current listing price is higher the more expensive a property, but is lower the more a
property is currently over-priced. Also, the level of the ¯rst o®er in a match is closer to
the current listing price after a price revision.
3.4 Sale Agreement
The timing and terms of sale agreements for the properties in our sample are summa-
rized in Table 13. In the table, the current listing price denotes the listing price at the
time of the sale agreement. Overall, properties in our sample sell at about 96% of their
current listing price and 13 percent of the properties sell at the listing price. The mean
and median time to sale are 11 and 7 weeks, respectively. In a booming housing market
sale prices are on average closer to the e®ective listing prices, a larger fraction of sales
occur at the listing price, and properties sell considerably faster.
Since variables describing the timing and terms of sale agreements are commonly avail-
able also in other data sets, here it su±ces to say that our analysis of these aspects of
our data produces results that are similar to the ones in the existing empirical literature
on housing transactions.
20Table 14
When First Match Unsuccessful
Yorkshire London London Overall
95-98 95-96 97-98 95-98
Additional weeks to sale 8 6 3 6
Gain as percent of max o®er ¯rst match 5.1 3.2 3.8 4.0
Percent sales below max o®er ¯rst match 13.9 19.8 3.2 13.1
Percent sales at max o®er of ¯rst match 20.8 14.1 23.8 19.5
Focusing instead on what is unique in our data set, in Table 14 we summarize informa-
tion relative to sale agreements that follow an unsuccessful ¯rst match. In 13 percent
of the cases properties sell at a price below the maximum o®er in the ¯rst match, 20
percent sell for the same amount, and the remaining two thirds of the properties sell at
a price above. On average, after an unsuccessful ¯rst match, sellers wait 6 weeks before
reaching a sale agreement and realize a 4 percent gain relative to the best o®er in the
¯rst match. 27
3.5 Viewings
For a sub-sample of 200 properties located in the local market within the Greater
London metropolitan area where one of our agencies operates, our data set contains
complete viewing records. A viewing is recorded each time a potential buyer visits
a property. On average, there are 9.5 viewings per transaction. Only 9 properties sell
after one viewing. The median number of viewings is 7, the maximum is 51. The average
number of viewings per week on the market is 1.7.
As illustrated in Figure 2, the arrival rate of viewings over time displays a monotonic
decreasing pattern that is similar to the one observed for the arrival rate of matches.
The viewing rate gradually decreases with time on the market. 28
27 This gain is large relative to the gain to the real estate agent who earns less than 2 percent
of the incremental pro¯t.
28 In particular, the data does not display a discrete drop in the arrival rate of viewings after
a week or two. Such a drop would suggest the presence of a sizeable stock of potential buyers
waiting for new properties to be listed and going to view them upon listing.
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Number of Viewings






To investigate whether there is a systematic relation between the rate of arrival of view-
ings and the listing price, we run a Poisson regression of the number of viewings per
week, on the two components of the initial listing price, ILISTPHAT and ILISTPRES,
and MONTHGL. 29 The results are reported in Table 15. Holding everything else con-
stant, relatively more expensive properties (i.e., properties for which ILISTPHAT is
relatively high) have a higher rate of arrival of viewings. On the other hand, properties
that are relatively over-priced (i.e., properties for which ILISTPRES is relatively high)
have a lower rate of arrivals of viewings. 30
Using the additional information on viewings we revisit some of the issues we addressed
earlier and investigate the role played by viewings in the process leading to the sale of
a property. In particular, we investigate the relationship of viewings with listing price
revisions and the arrival of matches. For each week a property is on the market, we de¯ne
two variables that measure the number of viewings in the week and the cumulative
number of viewings from initial listing. We include these two additional variables in
our econometric analysis of the probability of a ¯rst price change and the probability
of the ¯rst match occurring. The results of these estimations can be summarized as
follows. On the one hand, we ¯nd no relationship between the occurrence (or the lack)
of viewings and the probability of observing a price change. On the other hand, we ¯nd
29 The estimation procedure controls for the fact that properties di®er in their exposure time
(weeks on the market).
30 These result also obtain if instead of a Poisson model we consider more °exible functional
forms for the stochastic process of the arrival of viewings.
22that the more viewings in a week and the greater the total number of viewings since
initial listing, the higher the probability of receiving an o®er that week. 31
Overall, the results in this section indicate that, holding everything else constant, over-
priced properties tend to have low arrival rates of viewings, which in turn decrease the
arrival rate of o®ers. Thus, the listing price a®ects the arrival of o®ers indirectly, by
a®ecting the arrival of viewings.
4 Discussion
In the previous section, we investigated a number of issues pertaining to the details of
the process leading to the sale of a property, from its initial listing to a sale agreement.
This process can be thought of as a combination of a dynamic optimization problem
faced by the seller and a sequence of bargaining problems between the seller and each
potential buyer who initiates a match by making an o®er on the property. In this section,
we summarize our key ¯ndings, compare them with the predictions of existing theories,
and discuss alternative theoretical frameworks that are consistent with the empirical
evidence.
4.1 Listing Price
The solution of the dynamic optimization problem faced by the seller yields an initial
listing price and an intertemporal decision rule specifying whether, when, and to what
extent she should revise the listing price as time goes by. The evidence shows that a
sizeable fraction of sellers revise their listing price at least once. Those who do typically
reduce it by a substantial amount after waiting a substantial period of time without
receiving any o®er. These ¯ndings are in stark contrast to the predictions of most
existing theories of sellers' behavior in the housing market, but are fairly consistent
with individuals' behavior in other economic situations.
With respect to the choice of the optimal listing price, it is typically assumed that the
seller faces a trade-o® between the rate of arrival of buyers and the sale price: a low
listing price increases the arrival rate of buyers but precludes the possibility of sales
at a high price (e.g., Haurin [17]). This assumption is consistent with our empirical
evidence. Most existing theoretical models, however, imply that in equilibrium, either
31 The maximum likelihood estimates of Cox proportional hazard models for these probabilities
which include the additional variables on viewings are not reported here to economize on space.
23the seller never revises the listing price (e.g., Arnold [3], Chen and Rosenthal [6] and
[7], Horowitz [18] and Yava» s and Yang [34]), or she gradually lowers the listing price
over time in a continuous fashion (e.g., Coles [10]). 32 Taylor [32] proposes a two-period
model where it may be optimal for the seller to post an inordinately high initial listing
price in order to \complicate" the inference problem faced by uninformed potential
buyers if the property does not sell in the ¯rst period. Hence, the seller may choose
to over-price her property when entering the market, and then revise the listing price
downward in the second period if the property is still unsold.
The observation that price revisions are both infrequent and sizeable, however, is not
unique to real estate. For example, individual investors typically update their portfolio
decisions rather infrequently, and they tend to have focal points in the percentages
allocated to stocks and bonds (see, e.g., Ameriks, Caplin and Leahy [1], Lusardi [23]).
\Sticky" prices and behavior also arise in many other economic contexts, and several
models have been proposed that can account for these observations. 33
4.2 Matching, Bargaining and Sale Agreement
We now turn our attention to the matching and bargaining aspects of the process leading
to the sale of a property. The terms of a sale agreement are the outcome of a negotiation
between the seller and the (ultimate) buyer of the property. The evidence shows that
the majority of sales does not occur at the ¯rst o®er. Buyers whose ¯rst o®er is turned
down either increase their o®er or walk away. A substantial fraction of matches are
unsuccessful. The vast majority of sellers who fail to reach an agreement within their
¯rst match end up selling at a higher price. However, a signi¯cant fraction end up
eventually accepting a lower o®er. These ¯ndings directly contradict the predictions of
existing matching and bargaining theories of housing transactions.
With respect to the bargaining process between the seller and each potential buyer,
it is typically assumed that when a negotiation begins, the value of the surplus to be
divided (that is, the di®erence between the buyer's willingness to pay for the house and
the minimum price at which the seller is willing to sell the house) is known to both
parties (e.g., Nash [26], Rubinstein [29]). Based on this assumption, existing theoretical
32 To be more precise, in Coles' stock-°ow matching model, a seller ¯rst invites o®ers above
an endogenously determined reserve price in an auction setting. If no bids are received, she
then gradually lowers her asking price over time.
33 See, e.g., Reis [27] and the references therein
24models of housing transactions imply that agreement is reached on the ¯rst o®er ever
received and all matches between the seller and a potential buyer result in a sale (e.g.,
Arnold [3], Chen and Rosenthal [6] and [7], Krainer [22], Yava» s [33] and Yava» s and Yang
[34]).
The results of our empirical analysis clearly point out the limitations of complete infor-
mation bargaining models to study housing transactions, and suggest appealing to an
alternative class of bargaining models that can account for salient features of the data.
In a bargaining environment where the seller and the potential buyer of a property pos-
sess some private information about how much they value the property, the occurrence
of delays in reaching agreement and the possibility of a negotiation terminating with a
separation rather than an agreement are common features of an equilibrium. 34
Consider, for example, a bilateral bargaining environment where the potential buyer
makes all the o®ers (which is the case in our data) and after any rejection there is a
positive probability of an exogenous negotiation breakdown (e.g., because the potential
buyer ¯nds another property). In this environment, it may be optimal for the buyer
to make a relatively low initial \screening" o®er that is accepted only if the seller's
valuation is relatively low. If the o®er is rejected, the buyer updates his beliefs about
the seller's valuation and may either walk away or increase his o®er, unless of course the
negotiation breaks down for exogenous reasons. Note that although a rejection may be
followed by a higher o®er, it may still be optimal for a seller with a relatively low valu-
ation to accept the buyer's initial o®er because of the risk of negotiation breakdown. 35
Combining this bargaining framework with the long-term optimization problem faced
by the seller, we can also analyze the behavior of sellers across negotiations over time.
When some sellers face a time constraint for the sale of their property, their continuation
value declines over time. As a result, the minimum o®er they are willing to accept also
declines over time. Hence, it may be optimal for a seller to reject an o®er from a potential
34 See, e.g., the survey by Kennan and Wilson [19] and the references therein.
35 The strategies described here correspond to the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of
a ¯nite-horizon sequential bargaining game with one-sided incomplete information where the
uninformed player makes all the o®ers (e.g., Sobel and Takahashi [30]). This equilibrium would
also exist in an environment with two-sided incomplete information, where other equilibria
would also arise (e.g., Cho [9] and Cramton [11]).
25buyer early on and then accept a lower o®er from another potential buyer at a later
time. 36
In addition to providing an explanation for the empirical ¯ndings mentioned above,
a theoretical framework like the one described here has interesting, additional impli-
cations that can be addressed using our data. First, holding everything else constant,
the probability of success of a negotiation should decrease with the number of previ-
ous (unsuccessful) negotiations, and increase with time on the market. Obviously, the
probability a negotiation is successful also increases with the level of the o®ers. Second,
the sale price should decrease with time on the market, and increase with the number
of negotiations.
Ceteris paribus, the bargaining model we described implies that the probability a seller
accepts any given o®er is increasing and hence the sale price is decreasing over time.
Furthermore, consider two sellers who list identical properties in the same market at the
same time. Given the same time on the market, the model implies that the seller who
previously experienced more unsuccessful negotiations is more likely to have a higher
valuation of her property than the other seller. Hence, her current negotiation is more
likely to be unsuccessful. However, if it is successful, the sale price is more likely to be
higher.
Alternative theories that abstract from matching and bargaining would likely be silent
with respect to many of these implications. Complete information bargaining models
would predict no relationship between the number of matches and either the probability
of success of a negotiation or the sale price. Nevertheless, there are many alternative
models of search, matching, bargaining and learning that would generate similar predic-
tions. 37 Attempting to formally test the predictions of speci¯c models, or to compare
alternative theoretical frameworks with respect to their ability to ¯t various aspects
of the data is beyond the scope of this paper. However, we conclude our analysis by
36 A similar result would also obtain if the seller is uncertain about the distribution of buyers'
willingness to pay for her property and learns it over time (see, e.g., Burdett and Vishwanath
[5] and Dubra [12]), or if the buyers' willingness to pay for a property declines with time on
the market (as in Taylor [32]).
37 For example, a standard result in the search literature is that a higher reservation price
typically leads to a longer search time, but also to a higher sale price (see, e.g., Burdett and
Judd [4] and the survey by Rogerson, Shimer and Wright [28]). The same argument is also
made in the empirical real estate literature (see, e.g., Genesove and Mayer [13]).
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assessing whether the stylized predictions of a general class of models where incomplete
information and bargaining play a central role are supported by the data.
We begin by analyzing the relationship between the probability of success of a nego-
tiation and the history preceding that negotiation since initial listing. We de¯ne the
variable SUCCESS as a binary variable that equals one if bargaining within a match
leads to a sale agreement and zero if it terminates with a separation. The results of
a logit estimation where SUCCESS is the dependent variable and the set of indepen-
dent variables includes the predicted listing price, ILISTPHAT, the extent to which
the property is currently over-priced or under-priced, CLISTPRES, a dummy variable
denoting whether the seller revised the listing price prior to the match, DPC, agency
dummies, MONTH, MONTHGL, the number of weeks between initial listing and the
occurrence of the match, WTMATCH, the maximum o®er in the match as a percentage
of the current listing price at the time of the match, MAXOCLP, and the number of
previous (unsuccessful) matches, NPMATCH, are reported in Table 16. 38 As we can
see from this table the estimation results are generally consistent with the implications
38 We report robust standard errors which account for the fact that observations are indepen-
dent across properties but not across negotiations within the same transaction history.
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of the theoretical framework described above. In particular, the probability of success
of a negotiation decreases with the number of previous negotiations and increases with
time on the market. 39
Turning our attention to the relationship between the sale price and the events preceding
the sale, we regress the sale price, SALEP, on the predicted listing price, ILISTPHAT,
the extent to which the property is over-priced or under-priced at the time of the sale,
CLISTPRES, a dummy variable denoting whether the seller revised the listing price
prior to the sale, DPC, agency dummies, MONTH, MONTHGL, the number of weeks
from initial listing to sale agreement, WTSALE, and the number of matches since initial
listing, NMATCH. The results are contained in Table 17. Again, the estimation results
by and large support the general predictions of the class of models described above.
Ceteris paribus, the longer the time on the market, the lower the sale price. This is
a well known empirical ¯nding which is also consistent with other existing theories of
housing transactions (e.g., Miller [25], and Yava» s and Yang [34]). The ¯nding that the
39 Also note that the the probability of success of a negotiation increases with the level of
o®ers.
28sale price increases with the number of matches, however, is new and points to the role
of incomplete information and bargaining in the transaction process.
The estimation results reported in Table 17 also reveal an additional, interesting result
concerning the relationship between listing price and sale price. On average, $100 in the
predicted listing price (ILISTPHAT) translate into $98 in the sale price (with a 95%
con¯dence interval between $97 and $99). However, $100 above the predicted listing
price (CLISTPRES) only translate into $95 in the sale price (with a 95% con¯dence
interval between $94 and $96).
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have analyzed a new data set of housing transactions in England. The
main novelty of the data is the record of all listing price changes and all o®ers ever
made on a property. This data has enabled us to provide a more accurate picture of the
process by which residential properties are transacted and to discuss the implications
of our empirical ¯ndings for theoretical research on the strategic interaction between
buyers and sellers in the housing market.
Our main ¯ndings can be summarized as follows. First, listing price reductions are fairly
infrequent; when they occur they are typically large. Listing price revisions appear to
be triggered by a lack of o®ers. The size of the reduction in the listing price is larger
the longer a property has been on the market.
Second, the level of a ¯rst o®er relative to the listing price at the time the o®er is
made is lower the longer the property has been on the market, the more the property is
currently over-priced, and if there has been no revision of the listing price. Negotiations
typically entail several o®ers. About a third of all negotiations are unsuccessful (i.e.,
they end in a separation rather than a sale). The probability of success of a negotiation
decreases with the number of previous unsuccessful negotiations.
Third, in the vast majority of cases, a property is sold to the ¯rst potential buyer who
makes an o®er on the property (i.e., within the ¯rst negotiation). The vast majority of
sellers whose ¯rst negotiation is unsuccessful end up selling at a higher price, but a few
end up accepting a lower o®er. The higher the number of negotiations between initial
listing and sale agreement, the higher the sale price.
29In an attempt to further improve our understanding of the interactions between buy-
ers and sellers in the housing market, our future research will focus on developing a
theoretical framework capable of explaining all of the qualitative features of the data
and estimating this model using our data set. We will then use the estimated structural
model to quantify the e®ects of various policies on the behavior of buyers and sellers
in the housing market, and to study the potential e®ects of institutional reforms of the
housing market.
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